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JAMES FLEMING: So we'll open it up to questions. Pnina Lahav?
PNINA LAHAV: Jack, it's all wonderful, it's great scholarship, and it's
certainly impressive, but it's not originalism. Tell us more about that.
JACK BALKIN: You can understand originalism as a formal matter, as a
political phenomenon, and as a cultural phenomenon. As a formal matter, I
think Larry Solum has a good definition of originalism. Originalism has three
basic claims. First, originalists believe that something is fixed at the time of
adoption of a constitution; that's the fixation thesis. Second is the amendment
thesis: whatever this thing that is fixed can't be changed except through
amendment. Third is the consequences thesis: that this thing, which is fixed at
the time of adoption and can't be changed except through amendment, matters
for the correct interpretation of the Constitution.
Originalism is a family of theories, all of which share these three elements
in common. And I claim that my theory also has these three elements. First of
all, what is fixed at the time of adoption is the original semantic meaning of the
text. Second, it can't be altered, except through an Article V amendment. And
third, it matters for interpretation; it's the framework on which all construction
is built. There are some things that you just can't do because of the text. Some
of them are obvious; some of them are a little more subtle. And so, as a formal
matter, mine is an originalist theory.
On the other hand, it's not an originalist theory if we view originalism as a
political phenomenon. Originalism arose out of a set of conservative
mobilizations that begin in the '60s and '70s, that really flower in the '80s and
'90s, and then become theorized in law schools. So yes, this book is not an
example of political originalism. It's not the originalism we associate with the
conservative movement in America. But there are earlier versions of
originalism that have a different politics. There's Hugo Black's originalism,
which mine has a lot of affinities to. If you think Hugo Black was an
originalist, you should have no problem believing that I'm one.
The third aspect of originalism is cultural. This is a point David has made
before, and I strongly agree with it. In the last chapter of my book,
Constitutional Redemption,' I treat originalism as a cultural trope. Originalism
JACKM. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION (2011).
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involves the return to origin; it is a move to restore or redeem a practice. It's a
characteristic, not simply of legal movements, but also of religious movements
and cultural movements. You see it in Martin Luther. You see it in Zhu Xi's
Neo-Confucianism. You see it in all sorts of mobilizations in the United
States. You see it in the Tea Party, and you see it in liberal mobilizations as
well. You also see it in the Populists. The cultural idea is that we must return,
we must restore, we must redeem.
Such mobilizations are often textualist and protestant. They try to put the
power of interpretation in the hands of ordinary participants and not in the
hands of a hierarchy. They often argue that the hierarchy is corrupt and that it
has undermined the true nature of the regime, or the true nature of the religion,
or the true nature of the project, and therefore we must restore or redeem it.
My book clearly adopts this cultural trope of originalism. In fact, the
conservative mobilizations I described before also have that cultural trope, too;
it's just that liberals have forgotten it. Liberals don't remember that when
people in the '60s and '70s started to make these arguments, that's what they
were doing. They were saying: "Liberals have destroyed the Constitution.
Liberals have corrupted it. Liberal elites have wiped the Constitution away
and substituted some crazy liberal version of it. And we have to take the
Constitution back and restore it and redeem it." This is the cultural trope of
originalism, but it was also tied to a political program, which liberals don't
accept.
So, Pnina, of the three ways of thinking about originalism - formal,
political, cultural - I satisfy two out of three. And two out of three ain't bad.
GARY LAWSON: This is a completely unfair and absurd question. I'll open
it up to both. Suppose that instead of 2011, this was 1911. Can either of you
see writing books with the same methodological approach? Not the same
conclusions, not the same analysis. Or is the methodology itself temporally
and historically situated?
DAVID STRAUSS: I think so. I think my answer would be yes, that this is
the way the Constitution's been understood. Not from the beginning, but there
was a point when certain ways of doing things became established, and you
didn't have to keep going back to the text to figure out how to do things.
Which may have been fairly early on considering how much we brought over
from Britain.
GARY LAWSON: I'll say 1811.
DAVID STRAUSS: Well, yes. One reason why I think this approach is so
much a part of our way of doing constitutional law - not just in courts but
generally, to take Jack's earlier point - is the U.S. Constitution entered
mainstream on a legal tradition. And it modified it in lots of ways, but it didn't
modify it in every way.
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It was different in 1911. There wasn't nearly as much law about powers of
Congress as there is today. That was not entirely a twentieth century
development, but a late 19th century development. But sure, to understand
what the Marshall Court was up to, and to understand what the court of the late
nineteenth, early twentieth century was up to, I think they were doing
common-law stuff.
JACK BALKIN: It's not an absurd question at all; it's actually a very good
question. You know, Gary, my work is very historicist, and I think that
intellectual problems and theories arise to solve the problems of the times in
which they're offered. If we were writing these books in 1911, one of us might
have been writing a book saying, "Why don't we have a British parliamentary
system?" That's what people were thinking back then. And perhaps another
of us would be writing a tract calling for socialist revolution. I'm not going to
tell you who would have been whom. [laughter]
KHIARA BRIDGES: I would like to direct my question to David. In
speaking about Brown,2 you said that it would have been completely legitimate
for the court to make a moral argument that segregation was wrong, it was
immoral. And in fact, they were remiss in as much as they did not make a
moral argument.
My question then is, how does the court determine the proper morality? It
can't be through polling, because surely there was a moral dissensus around
the question of segregation. I am all about the court making moral
argumentation when the court agrees with my particular moral perspective, but
I would be more hesitant towards the court making moral argumentation when
they disagree with me.
DAVID STRAUSS: Thanks. A couple of things. Opinions in general, and the
opinion in Brown in particular, are not a good guide to what was actually going
on with the decision. The opinion, especially in a case like that, is going to be
a public, diplomatic document, and is not going to be, and there's no
requirement that it be, and it probably shouldn't be, a candid account of what
was really going on. So I wouldn't want to criticize the opinion for not being
more overtly moral. It was a little moral. I mean, there's no mistaking that the
court thought segregation was morally bad. But I wouldn't want to criticize
them for not going further in that direction.
By moral judgments, I really do just mean their moral judgments. You're
right, I don't mean polling, I don't mean trying to reflect conventional
morality. But I really do just mean, is it wrong or unfair or a stupid idea. I
think courts do that all the time. That's not the only input. But I think they do
that all the time.
If they're talking about some case involving the Fourth Amendment and
2 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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searches, they'll be thinking, is this unfair? And they'll be thinking, is this a
sensible way to regulate the police? I'd lump those together as judgments -
sometimes it's more natural to call them morality, sometimes it's more natural
to call them good policy. But they're all those kinds ofjudgments.
And you're right, of course, that if we simply turned them loose and said
"do the right thing," I don't think any of us would want to live in that world.
Or at least there'd be times when we'd regret having acceded to living in the
world when the judges didn't agree with us.
This is, I think, the great insight of what I'm going to call the common-law
approach. But it's much broader than that. It really is the strand of small-c
conservatism, which is, don't be too confident about your judgments. If you
can show that your judgments have this validation from other sources,
historical and contemporary, then okay, if you're sure. But the feeble and
fallible contrivances of our wisdom, in Burke's phrase, are not enough to
justify significant changes. And that's the idea.
One way to think about the point you made at the end, about not trusting
judges, is to say, okay, if you knew that the people making these decisions
were going to disagree with you on political issues, but were going to act in
good faith, what approach would you give them? We certainly wouldn't say,
"Just do what you think is right." I don't think we would give them
originalism, because I think it leaves too much open. I think it's too easy to
look at what the Framers said and see what you want.
I think the common law hedges them in. I think that is a good argument for
it, that this is what you'd give your enemies if you had to give them something,
because they would do less damage with this than they would with the other
approaches.
HUGH BAXTER: I have a question for David. I know the answer, since I've
read your book, but I wonder if you can say a little bit about how your theory
handles Roe v. Wade,3 and then Casey,4 and then Carhart.5
DAVID STRAUSS: Whatever one thinks of the decision in Roe - I think it
was rightly decided, although a difficult case - Roe has done terrible things to
constitutional theorizing. Because I think it has driven a lot of conservatives,
who would otherwise be sensible enough not to be originalists - sorry, Gary, I
had to get that in [laughter] - to originalism, because they hate Roe. They're
trying to find some platform to get at it. And, on the other side of the debate, I
think it's encouraged a degree of openness, a looseness on the part of
supporters of Roe.
The best I can do with Roe is to say, on a common-law approach, it's a
tough decision. It ought to be a tough decision. If an approach says Roe is
3 410U.S. 113 (1973).
4 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
1 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
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easy one way or another, I think that's a point against the approach. I think
there are well-established strands of the law that support what the court did in
Roe. The principle that people have autonomy in deciding the composition of
their family is well established in the law, not just judge-made law, statutory
law as well. And the idea that people have control over their bodily integrity
goes way back in the common law.
You put those two together and at least the right that the court recognized in
Roe, the right of a woman to control what goes on as far as whether she'll have
a child, is pretty firmly anchored.
If you were to say, "Well, okay, but why is that not overcome by the interest
in fetal life?" That, I think, is a much more difficult question. I've written
about it. I have some answers to that. But I think it's a difficult question. I
think it is justifiable, but I think it's hard to justify.
JAMES FLEMING: I want to give the students a chance to ask questions.
NAMRATA KOTWANI: Maybe I don't understand it well, Professor Balkin,
but is your idea of regime reinforcement in tension with the idea of checks and
balances? Not as a law student, but as a citizen, don't courts do their best work
when they disrupt the regime, like say Brown, those kinds of cases? Does that
make sense?
JACK BALKIN: It's an excellent question. What do political scientists mean
when they talk about regime maintenance? They do not mean something
opposed to checks and balances. Rather, they ask how the system of
separation of powers works in a particular regime, and how the different
institutions play their respective roles within the regime.
Let me give you an example. The New Deal revolution features enormous
popular mobilization and a series of elections in which Democrats win election
after election. They're pushing for a different conception of what government
is about. Under that new conception, the federal government and the states
will have amazing new powers to regulate the economy in the public interest.
At the same time, the President gains the power to run new administrative
agencies, which will be able to combine judicial, legislative, and executive
rulemaking functions.
That creates a problem. What are the limits to this new social contract?
What limits the power that has been bestowed by this new regime? And that's
where courts come in.
Courts play an important role in defining this new regime. They explain
what the limits of federal power are. They legitimate. And legitimation is
Janus-faced. That is, courts both permit and deny at the same time. They say,
"You can do this, but you can't do that." They give a bunch of explanations
for why power is appropriately or legitimately exercised and simultaneously
explain what it would mean for power not to be appropriately or legitimately
exercised. That's what these landmark opinions are doing, really.
2012] 1275
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
Second, at the same time, the political branches build new institutions.
Congress creates the Administrative Procedure Act, which puts courts in a new
role. In this new role, courts try to supervise and restrain executive
overreaching in these new executive agencies. This happens in '46 with the
APA.
Here again, the courts legitimate the administrative state. They're both
telling you what you can do and telling you what you can't do. It's two sides
of the same coin.
A third aspect of the regime is the question of judicial review. The courts
face a problem after 1937: If we're supposed to defer in areas of social and
economic legislation, why are we getting paychecks? I mean, what are we
doing for a living? This puzzle leads to the famous footnote in Carolene
Products6 and the reconceptualization of the purpose of judicial review.
David's written an article about Carolene Products that I mentioned earlier.7
In the old (pre-New Deal) regime, there's an undifferentiated thing called
liberty that courts are supposed to protect. Courts are the guardians of
constitutional liberty. Liberty is described in common-law categories, and it's
a complicated mess.
The new regime reconceptualizes what liberty is and the role of courts in
interpreting law and enforcing it. Now part of the courts' job is to police the
political process. Part of the courts' job is to protect the written provisions of
the Bill of Rights, as opposed to an undifferentiated conception of liberty. And
part of the courts' job is to articulate public values over time and to make sure
that these values are protected.
That's a different role, in some ways, than the courts had in the previous
Lochner-era or police-power regime. It also has this dual feature of
legitimation, simultaneously telling the political branches what they can do,
and what they can't do. From the standpoint of federalism it has an additional
feature: courts police outliers in state and local governments.
So, for example, if one jurisdiction has very odd or unusual laws - on, say,
freedom of expression or voting rights - that seem to be really draconian in the
context of other states or localities, the court's job is to say, "Sorry, you can't
do that."
A lot of the early criminal procedure decisions - Powell v. Alabama8 is one
example - police outliers, especially in the Deep South. In fact, you can
understand Brown v. Board of Education from this standpoint, too. At least
this is Scot Powe's view in his book on the Warren Court.9 By the time you
get to Brown, de jure segregation in public schools has been outlawed
everywhere except the Deep South. And in the border states, it's by local
county option only. Essentially Brown imposes a national - Scot would say
6 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
7 David A. Strauss, Is Carolene Products Obsolete?, 2010 U. ILL. L. REv. 1251.
8 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
9 L.A. SCOT POWE, THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2002).
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Northern - view of equality on a regional majority. We can understand Loving
v. Virginia,'0 Lawrence v. Texas,"l and a bunch of other cases this way as well.
This conception of the judicial role is not inconsistent with separation of
powers; rather, the question is what role courts play in the construction of the
particular regime in which we currently reside.
JAMES FLEMING: Any more student questions?
COURTNEY GESUALDI: This question could be for either of you, but
probably most for Professor Strauss. I'm wondering if we have this common-
law system in interpreting the Constitution, what role do you see the actual
document playing in interpreting?
DAVID STRAUSS: Right, that is the question, isn't it? I want to say the
document plays a critical role, but not a very visible role. Jack adverted to this
a bit, but let me say a little more about it.
In any system, there are some things that you really just want to have
settled. And how you settle it is of secondary importance, but it needs to be
settled, and it needs to be settled beyond dispute. Jack mentioned some of
these things.
You need to know when the President leaves office. To say the President
will leave office at an appropriate time after losing an election, that's a recipe
for chaos. You need to know that noon, on January 20th, the President will
leave office.
You need to know the answers to questions like that, like what system of
representation you're going to have, where representatives come from, how
many for each state. Some of that actually was left up for grabs in the original
Constitution, and some things didn't work so well as a result. But there are
issues like that that need to be settled.
We need the text to play that role. The text does it very nicely. It's there.
People follow it. To try to recreate all of that through a system of precedent or
adjudication would be terribly difficult, and not worth it. Because what we
really want is settlement.
Given that we want the text to serve that purpose, it makes sense for us to
say we're not just going to adopt the text for some purposes and ignore it for
other purposes. It makes sense for us to say, you've always got to connect
your views about what the law is to the text, because once you start blowing
off the text, then people might draw into question these things that really need
to be settled, and it would be very dangerous if they drew those matters into
question.
For example, suppose you said about a decision about abortion or whatever,
"who cares what provision of the Constitution I'm interpreting, I think it's
10 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
"1 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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correct." Once you say that, someone might say, well, if you didn't care about
the text in that case, why do you care about it when I make an argument that
conditions in the world really require that the President stay on after his term?
Why can't we ignore the text again?
So that's my account. What the text does is to settle some things. The other
thing it does is to put limits on things we might do. So we're going to have a
criminal justice system that looks a certain way. Now, within the boundaries
set by the Constitution there are all kinds of issues that we're going to litigate,
but the basic shape of the criminal justice system - there are going to be
lawyers, there are going to be juries, there are going to be impartial judges - is
laid out in the Constitution. We're going to disagree, but the disagreement is
cabined.
So I think the text plays that role. And it's absolutely critical in the sense
that you really could have terrible results if it didn't play that role, but it's low
visibility because these are issues that don't get litigated; that's the whole idea
- they don't get litigated.
So when cases get litigated, and certainly when cases reach the front page,
the text is just not in the picture. Then the limits set by the text, we're
operating comfortably within them, and the fighting is over things the text
doesn't resolve.
JACK BALKIN: David has just given me a great idea about how we use the
text. In chapters nine through eleven of my book, I discuss the commerce
power and the Equal Protection and Privileges or Immunities Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment. David says of these chapters: "Well, I notice Jack is
making lawyerly kinds of arguments, trying to explain how you would get to
the modem state and to modem civil rights and civil liberties protections by
using very familiar lawyer's materials. Jack doesn't realize it, but he's actually
engaged in common-law argument. He's using all of the resources of the past
and he calls it text and principle. But I, David Strauss, call it common-law
reasoning."
And David is right: I'm using all of the familiar lawyer's tools in developing
constitutional constructions. In David's model, all of the features of the
lawyer's toolkit, the familiar modalities - in Philip Bobbitt's terms - are part
of the common lawyer's toolkit. The common lawyer draws on precedents.
He draws on statutes. He draws on canons of construction. He draws on
famous speeches. He draws on history and uses it to create or construct his
account.
But if David's right, then the text must do more than simply function as a
coordination mechanism. Because the common lawyer often looks to the text
of a statute, and in this case the text of the Constitution, in order to explain and
justify certain kinds of structural arguments.
Take the treatment of voting rights under the Equal Protection Clause.
Looking at the text of the Constitution, we might notice a series of
amendments all having to do with voting - and expanding the right to vote.
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And we could see, in hindsight - just as David says in his discussion of the rise
of modem products liability law - that these successive amendments seem to
be approaching a more general principle - that voting is a fundamental interest,
or at least a very important interest for purposes of the Equal Protection
Clause. The right to vote by now seems presumptively to extend to all adults,
at least by the Twenty-Sixth Amendment.
That would be a very familiar common-law style of reasoning, where we use
the text of the Constitution in order to draw a structural conclusion about a
principle we see emanating from the Constitution itself. This use of the text,
however, would be different than the focal point model that David offers in his
book. Rather, it would be consistent with treating the text as just another part
of the common lawyer's toolkit.
Now, David doesn't mention this approach in his book, but I take it, given
the remarks he's made here, that he wouldn't find it strange at all. He might be
happy to admit that common-law lawyers could use the text in common-law
style reasoning. They might compare different parts of the text and consider
how one part differs from another and why the words are in a certain order and
so on, as long as these textual arguments are part of a larger structural account.
We would use the text, in other words, in order to make a common-law
argument. What do you think of that?
DAVID STRAUSS: I think that is part of the common lawyer's approach. I
mean, that's what goes on in common-law cases. It's a very familiar part of
admiralty, as I mentioned, which sort of synthesizes the law and the precedents
and the statutes.
What's distinctive about the common-law view is what you're using the text
for. There is one account of this kind of argument that says - and Jack used
the word structure - that says, well, there's certain imperatives that emerge
from the structure of the Constitution. So look at the Constitution, it values
separation of powers. There is, as Jack says in his book, there is no separation
of powers clause, but you look at the Constitution and you can see that the
Framers value separation of powers. There's no federalism clause, but you
look at it and you see federalism is structurally important to the Constitution.
If you stop there, I think that's not common law-ish. That's more, "I'm
going to dope out what my instructions were. I got some orders from my
superior, and my superior is no longer around, hasn't been around for a while,
and I can't quite figure out how to carry out these orders. So I'm going to look
at what she said and, you know, she didn't quite say this, but when I look at
Point A, Point B, Point C, you know, I bet she wanted me to do E and F."
Sometimes these structural arguments take that form. With statutory
interpretation, I think that is often totally the right way to think about it. That's
not a common-law way to think about it. The common-law way to think about
it is more like, "I think this is a good idea. Is it just me out there all on my own
thinking it's a good idea? If it is, then I can't do anything about it. But if this
is a good idea and things have been moving in my direction, and other people
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have thought it is, too, and there are lots of developments that suggest that I'm
not the only one who thinks this is a good idea, well, then maybe I have a
reason to implement it."
And it's using that approach, rather than reading the document simply as a
set of sometimes very subtle, sometimes hard-to-read instructions.
So I would say that's the difference. The other thing I'd want to say about
common law - and one reason I think it's an effective response to the
criticisms that are often made of "living constitutionalism" - is that this has
been going on for a long time. This isn't something that we just thought up.
This has been going on since way before the founding of the country, and
judges have been doing it, and doing it at least well enough. And if you can
maintain continuity with that, that's a point in its favor.
RESPONSE AND COLLOQUY CONCERNING THE PAPERS BY JAMES FLEMING,
LINDA MCCLAIN, AND HUGH BAXTER
DAVID STRAUSS: Thank you, Jim, for the friendly amendments. And
thanks also to Linda and Hugh for really illuminating talks. Let me just touch
on a couple points Jim made, and then I do want to say something connected to
Linda's talk, and in a way with Hugh's as well.
The question, as Jim put it, is can a common-law view distinguish between
the Constitution and constitutional law. And he connected that question with
two other issues. One is the Cooper v. Aaron12 problem. And the other is
whether the approach that I've tried to put forward can give an account of
erroneous decisions, can explain why Plessy v. Ferguson,13 for example, was
wrong.
I want to say these are three different questions, and have to be answered
differently. The Constitution versus constitutional law, I think that's a very
difficult question, and I'm not sure that needs to be answered. I don't know
why it matters whether we consider Marbury v. Madison,14 the principle of
judicial review, part of the Constitution or part of constitutional law. Or the
principle that you can't engage in racial discrimination, or the principle that
you can't throw your political opponents in jail. By the way, it's not at all
clear the First Amendment, as originally adopted, was intended to preclude
that. Some of those people who were instrumental in drafting the First
Amendment went out and passed the Alien and Sedition Acts and did try to
throw their political opponents in jail.
So those are principles that have developed over time. Whether we say,
"No, no, they are now in the Constitution," or say, "Well, they're part of
constitutional law," I don't know what turns on that. You could designate the
text as the Constitution and the rest as constitutional law. I think that's a
12 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
13 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
14 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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perfectly sensible thing to do. But then I'd want to say there are lots of things
in what we're calling constitutional law that are as absolutely as firmly rooted
as anything in the text. And in fact, subject to fewer interpretive liberties than
many of the provisions in the text are.
So I'm not sure that's a useful distinction. I think it's very, very difficult to
draw. And it might just be better to say, no, we're doing constitutional law,
that's the project. And the text plays a role in that project, and precedent plays
a role in that project, and some other stuff plays a role in that project, and we
don't need to draw that distinction.
Now, I'm not sure Jim would disagree with that, but I think he would say,
"Well, then you need to explain why some decisions, acts of constitutional
lawmaking, are wrong if you're not going to say they're inconsistent with the
Constitution." I agree, this time I completely agree that any theory has to have
a way of doing that, has to have a way of condemning some decisions as
wrong.
But it's not as if we have trouble saying certain common-law decisions are
wrong. They're wrong through their inconsistency with precedent, or they're
wrong just as a matter of policy and morality. If a court came up today and
said automobile drivers are strictly liable if they're in an accident with a
pedestrian, in any jurisdiction I know of, that would be wrong, that would be
inconsistent with precedent. (It might or might not be such bad policy.) That
would be a wrong common-law decision, because of its inconsistency with the
common-law sources of law.
As to whether Plessy is wrong as a matter of law, I think questions like that
are actually kind of hard. Plessy I think we can say is wrong because Jim
Crow segregation was actually a pretty new institution at the time Plessy was
decided. There weren't really deep historical roots, contrary to what
segregationists tried to claim. But if you were to ask a question, for example,
in 1950, would it have been wrong for the Supreme Court to refuse to
recognize a constitutional right to gay marriage, as a legal matter, would that
be a wrong decision?
Some of us might think today it would be the right thing for the Supreme
Court to recognize their right. Whatever your views are about that, it's hard
for me to see my way clear to saying in 1950, it would have been legally
wrong for the Supreme Court to say, no, there is no such right. Or that
whatever your views are about capital punishment today, that in 1850, it would
have been wrong for the Supreme Court to say capital punishment is not
unconstitutional in all circumstances. You might want to condemn it morally,
you might even want to say in some of these instances, this is an occasion in
which the Supreme Court should have engaged in a version of civil
disobedience and done something that was legally wrong, but morally
imperative.
But I think these are hard questions. And I think that theory ought to
recognize them as hard questions.
As for Jim's view that my theory of common-law constitutional
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interpretation is a moral reading, we're all doing some imperialism here and
saying, no, no, your theory's actually my theory. And I want to do that with
Jim's theory of the moral reading as well. I think that the idea of integrity in
the moral reading is really doing the work that commitment to precedent does
in common-law theories. This is obviously a bigger conversation. But I'd
want to say that one virtue of the common-law approach is that it has much
deeper roots, that we've been doing common law for a lot longer than we've
been doing law's integrity or the moral reading.
A quick comment on some of the issues Linda raised and Hugh also. Jack
and I have had this conversation before, and Linda brought this out. I'm
disquieted by the use of religious metaphor and religious language in talking
about the Constitution.
Imagine someone who said, "Look, I live in your country, I'll play by the
rules, but my faith commitments are elsewhere, I have no interest in vesting
my faith in your Constitution. In fact, I think it's blasphemous to do so, and
I've no interest in your redemptive projects. And my traditions stem from
somewhere other than your Founders. I feel no connection to your Founders. I
just want to play by the rules and live here." We ought to be able to give that
person an account of constitutional law consistent with those views.
Those aren't my views, they're not Jack's views, they're not your views,
and maybe it's just a hypothetical person who thinks that way. But we ought
to have an account for that person that doesn't rely on faith. I worry that the
reliance on faith is a little bit illiberal, that it's a way of establishing a
community that excludes people who say, "My traditional and faith
commitments lie elsewhere," and we shouldn't do that.
For me, that approach gives me some pause about what I otherwise think is
a really fruitful and powerful way of thinking about the Constitution. I think
the things Linda said brought out that disquiet, which I think she might share.
JACK BALKIN: One way of approaching one question Linda asked is this:
It's 2011 and you're at a meeting between Tea Party people and Occupy Wall
Street people. And they're both making contradictory claims on the
Constitution. How do I know who's right?
It should be obvious, just from the way I phrased it, that there's no way of
knowing outside of time and outside of politics who's right. As a participant,
you must stake a claim on who's got the right conception of the Constitution.
You must evaluate them in your own day as best you can. It's always possible
that neither of them has the right conception of the Constitution.
Some social mobilizations have done things that in retrospect we've been
proud of- for example, the civil rights movement - and some have done things
that in retrospect we haven't been proud of - for example, the Know-Nothings
or the Klan. But are there a set of algorithms or criteria you can use at the time
to decide who was right and who was wrong? There are only the criteria that
you would use - as a participant in the system - to decide what a good
interpretation of the Constitution is. That is to say, you are a participant and
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you're judging others as a participant.
An interesting feature of constitutional politics is that sometimes you
persuade other people that you are right, and sometimes they persuade you.
Sometimes you end up winning; sometimes you end up being the dissenter.
That is how constitutional politics works.
But you should never give up your own right to pronounce on whether you
think the received wisdom or dominant powers in constitutional politics are
right or wrong. You should always be able to say, "Well, you guys may be
winning, you guys may control the Supreme Court now, in fact, you guys may
also control the Presidency and Congress. But I still think you're wrong. I still
think that you are mangling the Constitution." That's the right of the dissenter.
But this brings me to the other point that Linda was making. That may be
so, but what are the resources you would bring to bear in order to make such a
judgment? And this actually connects the idea of a fallen Constitution to the
question that you were asking about Plessy. That is, was Plessy correctly
decided in 1896? Or to put it another way, was it the best one could do with
the Constitution?
It is a mistake to think that the resources that are available in 1850 for
making a constitutional argument are identical to the resources that we have
today in 2011. Each time has its own set of resources. The claim that the
Constitution is redeemable is not a claim that in 1850 people could or should
see the Constitution exactly the way we would see it in 2011, or even that they
would agree with our considered moral judgments today.
The claim, rather, is that each time has its resources for constitutional
redemption and that what actually happened, as we view things in hindsight,
does not exhaust what was available to the people of a particular time, even if
things did not turn out well. The resources available in the constitutional
tradition in 1850 are present for people to strike out a better path. And they
have to judge that path from their own time, they have to assess how it might
be possible for them to redeem themselves in their own time. That's what the
possibility of constitutional redemption means. But, of course, the resources
available to you at your time are always limited. They're limited by political
compromise, by injustice, by all of the restrictions of everyday life, by lack of
knowledge, by unintended consequences, and by many other things. Besides,
in real life, all forms of political redemption are compromised. They're never
secure. They're never guaranteed. They're never pure. They're never
innocent. That's also a feature of redemption.
When we look closely at all of the progressive movements, or movements
for liberty or equality of the past, we discover that they were all deeply
compromised in their own day. We see that now. In fact, people saw it then,
too. Whether you're trying to achieve a more equitable distribution of wealth
in America, or whether you think gay people should be able to marry the
people they love, or whether you think that we haven't done enough about the
mass incarceration of African Americans in the United States - no matter what
your goal, you will discover the same problem of fallenness in your own
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attempts to try to bring about justice.
But that does not mean that you should give up simply because you can't
achieve perfection. You're not required to achieve the great work, but you are
not free to refrain from it.
Linda noted the religious imagery in my arguments about redemption. It is
a kind of religious imagery, but it does not owe its authority to any particular
religion. Religions are a way of understanding basic problems about the
human condition - collectivity, community, sacrifice, faith, hope for something
better in the future. Religions are very good at articulating these values, but
they're human values. And different religions articulate them in different
ways.
To say that these are inherently religious values is to misunderstand why
religions exist. Religions explain these values to people and make community
out of these values.
Now, we could trace the genealogy of this particular set of religious ideas,
and Linda is right that they feature an interesting amalgam of Protestantism,
but it's not entirely Protestant. It's not Calvinist, because you don't know that
you're saved, and there is no guarantee that you're going to be saved. It's a
little bit Jewish; which is hardly surprising, because after all, who am I? A
nice Jewish boy from Kansas City, Missouri.
Every good deed hastens the coming of the Messiah. And in this story, the
Messiah hasn't shown up yet, so it's clearly Jewish, not Christian. It might be
Daoist. After all, redemption means returning the Constitution to its proper
path. Now that's a Daoist idea as much as it is a Jewish idea.
So you might say that this is a mongrel conception. It doesn't correspond to
any particular religion. Perhaps that's true, but of course I'm not trying to
correspond to any particular religion. I'm trying to make an argument about
politics. It so happens that the easiest way to make these arguments is to draw
on certain ideas that are particularly salient in religious traditions, but with
respect to which religion does not have a monopoly.
But I wanted to put you on the spot, Hugh. Throughout the book I argue
that democratic legitimacy is produced over time, through a process, starting
from a situation which is imperfect. Through the use of democratic means and
democratic discussion and protest Americans attempt to produce increased
democratic legitimacy over time.
Hugh, you just finished a big book on Habermas, 15 who also has an account
of democratic legitimacy as something produced over time. And what I
wanted to know is this: what are the similarities and differences between the
account of how democratic legitimacy is produced over time in Living
Originalism16 and the version that Habermas is trying to articulate in Between
Facts and Norms17 and other works?
15 HUGH BAXTER, HABERMAS: THE DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (2011).
16 JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIG1NALISM (2011).
17 JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS (1996).
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HUGH BAXTER: There's an extraordinary similarity. And here are the
things that leap to mind. One of them is the image of Constitution as a project,
that it's an unfinished project; it will never be finished. It's ongoing. It goes
through generations.
Second, the emphasis on the Constitution outside the courts. And so, he
gives you a fairly elaborate mapping of social theory, of the infrastructure
necessary for the Constitution to be democratically legitimate. It isn't just
courts; it requires - and this will be congenial to you - it requires first that
problems be raised and ventilated within civil social organizations - clubs,
organizations, the workplace for that matter, although he doesn't locate that in
civil society.
And then eventually, they percolate - he loves water metaphors - and wind
up in the public sphere. And some of the ideas there are translated or put in a
form where they can be accessible or understood within, for example,
legislatures or courts.
So it's the same kind of image I think you have of Constitution making from
the ground up. And he's interested also in the political branches, not just the
courts.
So I see the similarities as being very, very striking.
JAMES FLEMING: Let's open it up to questions from the audience.
UNIDENTIFIED: When you talk about redemption, or when you talk about
originalism, you say that it's a project of interpretation, going back to the
principles of the Founders and the Constitution. And so, what is the
redemption project that we're supposed to be embarking on? Is it a redemption
of the original meaning of the Constitution? Or is it a redemption of our
personal stake in the interpretation of it?
JACK BALKIN: The preamble actually tells you what the project's supposed
to be about - to achieve a more perfect union, establish justice, ensure
domestic tranquility, secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our
posterity.
What it means to redeem, of course, is not simply to follow an established
path. In other words, we're not redeeming the Founders' vision of a more
perfect union. We're redeeming our vision of a more perfect union. A
promise was made in the past: We're going to have equality. We're going to
have equal protection of the laws. Every citizen is going to be guaranteed the
privileges and immunities of citizenship. They promised. They said they were
going to do it. Okay, now we have to make it happen.
But of course, the problem is the Founders' vision of what it would mean to
fulfill that promise might not be satisfying to us. It might in fact be a terrible
idea. We have to fulfill that promise in our time. That's what we mean by
redemption.
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Redemption is not making things conform to a preexisting template. It's not
a Hegelian story, in which the oak was always there in the acorn, with all of its
leaves. Instead, you have to actually make the promise real; you have to
redeem it.
Here's another way of thinking about it. Think about redemption stories in
the Bible: the redemption of man by Christ, the redemption of the Hebrews by
God. Now, after the redemption occurs, is everything exactly as people
expected it would be? No. It's all contingent. Things occur that nobody
imagined were going to occur. And the problems that one faces are the
problems that occur because of how you got to where you're going to be.
In fact, what's so interesting about the redemption story of the Hebrews is
that it is kind of a downer. The Hebrews were redeemed. They have a big
celebration. Miriam the prophetess starts singing, and they're all dancing
around. And about a couple weeks later they're praying to the Golden Calf.
And then there's a lot of smiting. [laughter]
Then, everything's hunky-dory for a while. And then they have a rebellion.
And then there's more smiting. And then there are more problems. By the
way, these guys who are rebelling and worshiping idols - I should just point
out - these are the redeemed ones. The ones who stayed in Egypt were not
redeemed.
And so, eventually, God realizes that these people are worthless. Well, he
doesn't say that exactly. He says they're all going to have to die in the desert,
and a new generation is going to have to be born that is actually worthy of
being free. That's why the Hebrews have to wander in the desert for forty
years.
The meaning is that only people who had the benefit of the imperfect
redemption of the past could actually redeem themselves in a way that was
appropriate for the future. That is, only people born in freedom were deserving
of the opportunity that would enable them to win the Promised Land.
This is a very sad story, right? Because it says that the first redemption is
incomplete, it's compromised, it's impure, it's not innocent. But it makes
possible another redemption, and that redemption, in turn, makes possible yet
another redemption.
So we're not bound by the redemptive ideals of the Founders. My
goodness, we wouldn't want to be. But they offer us the possibility of our own
redemption.
LINDA McCLAIN: Listening to Jack talk makes me realize how complicated
using a term like redemption is. I could tell another story about how Adam
sinned, and ever since then Man has been in exile, and what does it take to put
Man right? It's justification through faith in Jesus. And it's not me who lives,
but Christ who lives in me; my body's now the temple for the Holy Spirit.
Jack, you use language of impurity, incompleteness, imperfection,
inevitably fallen. But there's a Christian narrative, which is, the work is done,
and Jesus did it, through the Atonement, and now you have to live a Christ-like
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life in this world. Your conception reminds me more of a model of
vulnerability, we don't know how it's going to come out, God is kind of
powerless, God Himself is vulnerable. There are many different versions of
theology, and some of them really do think that there's this powerlessness of
God, and humans have to help redeem God. There's some Jewish mysticism
that sparks have all been trapped and we can all liberate the sparks.
There are so many different pictures of redemption, but not every picture is,
as you described it, that it is imperfect, always impure, and that you restore the
state that was lost.
JACK BALKIN: This is my understanding of redemption.
LINDA McCLAIN: I understand.
JAMES FLEMING: David's book certainly communicates his wariness
about faith and redemption and all these things. But I would point out that the
title of his first chapter is "Originalism and Its Sins."
KEN KERSCH: Maybe I'm just echoing what you said in your remarks, Jim,
but I want to ask both speakers about originalism and its nature. When I think
of originalism, I think of it as the argument that there is only one legitimate
source for us or for judges to look at. And that authoritative source of
constitutional meaning, however we interpret it, is the founding, or the moment
that provision of the text was ratified.
How much is the difference between the two of you that Jack Balkin, as an
originalist, is a monist as to what we look at as sources in constitutionalism?
For Jack, it's one thing - we look to the founding, though he has a very
capacious understanding of that. How much is Jack a monist, and how much is
Professor Strauss a pluralist? He says we might look at original meaning, we
might look at the text, we might look at pragmatic considerations, all sorts of
things.
DAVID STRAUSS: Jack's going to speak for himself. I don't see him as a
monist, as looking only to one source. But I also don't see him as an
originalist, so I don't know that I'm going to be very helpful on that side of the
question you raise, which I think is a good question, about just how you define
originalism.
Leaving aside the cultural trope - which I do think with Jack is a lot of
what's going on in these debates - I think here's the distinction. And it's an
old distinction in law. I do this a little bit in the book. You can think of law as
a command. In lots of contexts, that's the right way to think about it. If you're
a bureaucrat and you've got the code of federal regulations, there's your law.
At least that's the starting point. You might need to interpret, you might need
to elaborate, but that's it. And it's authoritative because it's been issued by the
person who has the power to issue it. Lots of times, not all the time, but lots of
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times statutes work the same way. And there are circumstances in which the
Constitution, I think, should be viewed that way, to a degree. A recent
constitutional amendment I think has that kind of authority.
There's a different conception of law, though, and that is law as, at its root,
like custom. It didn't emerge at some particular time, there's no lawgiver.
And if you think about custom or the common law, that's true of it. There's no
authoritative act that created the law. It emerged from a variety of sources
over time and it was never 100% clear at what time that became the law, but
we can say now it is.
UNIDENTIFIED: Hayekian.
DAVID STRAUSS: Well, there's a Hayekian element to it, there's a Burkean
element to it. Yes, it's that tradition, as opposed to the Austinian tradition.
And I see originalism as the Austinians and the common lawyers as Burkean.
And I think they're both respectable traditions; I just think for the U.S.
Constitution as it is, in our time, that the Austinian tradition doesn't work and
the Burkean one does.
JACK BALKIN: No one has ever accused me of being a monist. The key
distinction is between commands and resources. Things that are adopted, at
whatever time, are commands; you have to follow them. But resources for
construction are things that occur throughout history, and there are many of
them.
RESPONSE AND COLLOQUY CONCERNING THE PAPERS BY GARY LAWSON AND
DAVID LYONS
JACK BALKIN: David Lyons is asking two separate questions, and I want to
separate them. Remember, I said before that I'm interested in what's a
command and what's a resource for construction. The original meaning of the
text is a command. Everything else is a resource. For example, if the text says
"equal protection of the laws," we have to apply the guarantee of "equal
protection of the laws." The original expected applications, the original
intentions, the original articulations of principle are not part of original
meaning, and therefore they are not commands. They're resources for
construction.
Now, David asks, why should these materials, which are not commands,
play any role at all as resources? That is, why do we exclude them when we're
trying to figure out what original meaning is, and yet bring them back in when
we're trying to engage in the work of construction? That's a great question.
Here is, I think, the best answer to it.
I talk about two different kinds of underlying principles in Chapter 12 of the
book. One kind are structural principles, and the other kind I call heuristic
principles. The idea of a heuristic is an aid to understanding. These are
principles that we use to try to do our job. And in some sense we have no
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choice but to ascribe certain kinds of heuristic principles to the abstract
principles that we find in the text. Because if we didn't, we wouldn't be able
to get anywhere.
But, when we search for heuristics to build out constructions, why should
we turn to a reconstruction of principles, commitments, ideas that we find in
the time of the founding - or indeed, at any other time in history? That is to
say, why would you look to history at all in order to come up with heuristics
for articulating abstract principles?
Suppose that you're arguing that gay people shouldn't be imprisoned for
having sex or that they should be able to marry the people they love. And
suppose in support somebody offered an argument from history: "Yes, that is
class legislation. That is making gays into a disfavored caste. That is
attempting to subordinate them through law."
Consider the following response: "Why in the world would I be interested in
that question? I want to know what equality requires. I don't care at all
whether or not this is caste legislation or whether this is class legislation.
Come on, that's just what Senator Jacob Howard said at some point in the
Congressional debates. I don't care at all."
This is really what David is getting at when he asks his question. The
answer is that when we're in the realm of heuristic, when we're in the
construction zone, when we're no longer interested in the question of what the
[original meaning of the] command is, but we're trying to come up with tools
for construction - we're trying to explain to somebody else who disagrees with
us what the right way to go forward is - we have to find common topics,
common topics that people we deal with in the public square understand as
having some purchase on them.
We need, in other words, to quote Vico, a sensus communis [a common
sense]. We need to find something that others see as part of them, and that we
see as part of us, that allows us to reason together. Now we're no longer in the
realm of logic, we're in the realm of rhetoric and dialectic. We're trying to
find common tools of argument and understanding. And what we do
inevitably - and I think we are right to do so - is draw upon memory and upon
historical statements of principle. And then we take those statements of
memory, and we refine them through our present-day experience.
What did Jacob Howard [who introduced the Fourteenth Amendment in the
Senate] know about gay people? He probably didn't know a damn thing about
gay people. Maybe he was gay, I don't know, but I doubt he knew anything
about gay people. Yet when we [use Howard's language and] say that these
laws are class legislation, that these laws are caste legislation, what we are
doing is invoking the memory of a particular commitment, articulated by
someone in the past, and claiming it as our commitment. We are saying, "You
should believe in this, too, because, after all, this is your history, too. This is
your memory, too."
This is an interesting kind of move that law makes continuously. It's a
claim about memory, and that's not true of many forms of moral argument.
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For example, if we were going to make an argument about gay rights in the
context of a philosophical treatise, and we made an appeal to historical
memory, I think that most philosophers would say, "Oh, come on, get to the
real argument. Stop making the crazy argument from memory."
Whereas, in the context of law, the argument from memory and the appeal
to memory as a form of heuristic in order to articulate a moral principle is seen
as completely appropriate. It's what you do. Why is this an appropriate form
of legal argument? I think it has something to do with the requirement that we
understand ourselves as continuing a political project that has been bequeathed
to us by people in the past and that we are continuing in the present and the
future.
We turn to memory as a way of articulating heuristic principles because of
the belief that there is a commonality between the principles of people who
lived in the past and our principles today. Even if they didn't know what gay
people were, even if they wouldn't have thought for a minute that this
legislation is caste legislation, I claim that I am connecting their commitments
to my commitments, and I am using those commitments to appeal to you now
in the present.
This is a kind of political argument that is worked into law. But it's not the
kind of argument that you would use in other venues. I think that it is
characteristic of a lot of constitutional argument.
I think that's why memory and history are used in constitutional argument.
But I also think that attempts to ground those forms of argument in commands
[as opposed to resources], and to say "this is what they wanted, therefore we
must do it" is just not going to work, it's just not going to make any sense. On
the other hand, if we understand history and memory as producing tools for
understanding - attempting to meet people in a common space, appealing to
common commitments, appealing to a common history and memory - then this
use of the past makes sense. It also suggests why if you went to another
country and started to argue about the French Constitution by quoting Jacob
Howard, they would look at you as if you were a crazy American. It's because
that is not an appropriate heuristic from the standpoint of the French
constitutional tradition.
I think we must try to understand the nature of the arguments that people
make when they offer constitutional constructions.
On the other hand - and here I return to David's point - there are some
contexts in which it might be entirely appropriate to forego all of those
heuristics and appeals to memory and go straight to arguing about what justice
requires. Then we ask the philosophers what they think. The question, though,
is whether those arguments will be particularly persuasive in the arena in
which they are posed. This is, of course, the point of the debate about the
Philosophers' Brief in Glucksberg8 : Did the people who wrote the
18 Brief for Ronald Dworkin et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents,
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (No. 96-110).
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Philosophers' Brief misunderstand the nature of the enterprise when they tried
to make a constitutional argument by making a philosophical argument? On
one account, it was a misunderstanding; on another, it was entirely appropriate,
but it was not the only way to argue the case.
David's other question concerns the idea of faith. I talk a lot about [William
Lloyd] Garrison in Constitutional Redemption. The reason why Garrison
could not be understood as a faithful interpreter of the Constitution does not
have anything to do with whether or not a majority of people agreed with his
views. The reason, rather, has to do with the following question: Was he
attempting to further the constitutional project? Was he putting himself on its
side? Was he trying to make it work? Or, rather, was he attempting to jettison
it? Was he trying to exit? Was he saying, "It's not worth it; I wash my hands
of it"?
The claim I make in Constitutional Redemption, and also in this book, is that
constitutional interpretation involves participation in an ongoing trans-
generational project of politics and that it requires at least this much of us: it
requires us to put ourselves on the side of the document and say, "No, I'm not
trying to interpret the U.N. Charter. I'm trying to interpret the United States
Constitution, and I really want it to work. I really want to make it succeed as a
plan for politics. And I'm going to do my best to make it succeed."
When Dworkin says that we should make the law "the best it can be," this is
not a claim about the self, it's a claim about the object of interpretation. By
contrast, I'm making a claim about the self, and the self s participation in the
project. The faithful interpreter says, "I'm on its side. I want it to work. You
are trying to do something terrible to my Constitution, but I want to protect my
Constitution." Fidelity is not simply a property of an object, but a relationship
between the interpreter and what is being interpreted.
This point has connections to the way that we talk about infidelity.
Faithlessness and infidelity are connected: if you are faithless to another
person, they cannot rely on you. To be faithful is to be the sort of person who
can be relied upon. A faithful person says, "I'm on your side, I'll take care, I'll
do my best for you." So when we talk about fidelity in interpretation, we are
talking about a relationship between ourselves and something else, and that is
why the word "fidelity" borrows from or builds on the notion of faith in
interpersonal relationships. The two kinds of fidelity are not the same thing,
but they come from the same root, especially when we're talking about
political commitment.
David asked, In what sense was Douglass faithful to the Constitution? Well,
here's the puzzle. Douglass makes two kinds of arguments. First he argued
that Congress could, if it wanted to, abolish slavery in the United States - not
only in the territories, but even in the States. Second, he argued that, read
appropriately, the Constitution could make slavery unconstitutional in the next
generation. He pulled out the Constitution and said, "It says here no person -
not 'no citizen' - but no person, shall be denied life, liberty or property without
due process of law." When somebody is made a slave, they're denied their
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liberty. Yet they're not charged with any crime. They don't have the right to
an attorney. They don't have any process to defend themselves against being
made into a chattel. How can it be that this is consistent with due process of
law? Nobody denies that a slave is a person. Therefore, slavery violates the
clear meaning of the Fifth Amendment, that no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law. What more do you want?
What part of the text don't you understand?
Now, this isn't just an idiosyncratic view of Frederick Douglass. This is the
view of the Free Soil Party in the late 1840s. It's the view of the Republican
Party in 1856 and 1860; and it's in their platform. By the time we're in the
middle of the Civil War, it is the view of the dominant party in the United
States, the Republicans. That's what happens to this so-called crazy view:
"What part of due process of law don't you understand" becomes the dominant
view, and it leads to the passage in 1862 of a law that abolishes slavery, first in
the District of Columbia and then later in the federal territories.
Part of the reason why we have difficulty deciding whether Douglass is
being faithful is that we assume his view is "off the wall." But if we suddenly
were to imagine that this view is no longer off the wall but is entirely
mainstream, as it is by 1862, then it's not so difficult to see Douglass as being
faithful to the Constitution. In fact, it seems entirely appropriate.
So the point of talking about fidelity is to get you to stop thinking about it in
terms of the question of what's on the wall and off the wall and instead ask the
question of whether or not you're committing yourself to the constitutional
project and trying to redeem it. This is a different way of thinking about
fidelity than most people think about it. But I think it's very helpful, especially
when we consider the question of fidelity in the context of social
mobilizations.
I had one question to ask about Gary's very interesting paper. Gary, are you
engaged in construction when you engage in this burden-shifting move?
GARY LAWSON: Yes, I have a little point at the very end of the paper where
I pose that question. And so, you could phrase this as a form of construction,
and my answer to that is, fine. I don't think so only because I think that if you
want to call it a construction, it's one that emerges from ascertainment.
JACK BALKIN: But what part of the text, what clear statement in the text
gives you the idea that this burden-shifting rule is part of the original meaning?
GARY LAWSON: The construction comes from a basic principle of
epistemology that is external to the Constitution, but that is part of, I would
say, language and rational thought. And that's the basic proposition that he
who asserts must prove. That's the element that is constructed, if you will.
But I don't think it's constructed in the sense of built up. I think it's implicit in




So that's why I don't really care whether one calls it a construction or not. I
don't think it's the kind of construction that you or Randy Barnett or Larry
Solum would be talking about. It's a different category. No more than the
Aristotelian laws of logic are constructions.
JACK BALKIN: Now I can see what my disagreement would be. I would
classify your burden-shifting proposal as a construction just like anything that
you find in McCulloch v. Maryland.19 I don't find the burden-shifting rule in
the text, on a fair reading of the text. And I also don't regard it as a
requirement of logical necessity. My proof for this - it's not much of a proof-
is that generations of jurists and commentators about the Constitution have not
seen this burden-shifting move as a matter of logical necessity. If it were a
matter of logical necessity, I suspect lots of people would have pointed this
out.
GARY LAWSON: What's a matter of logical necessity is the proposition that
he who asserts must prove. It requires a number of inferential steps to connect
that to the Constitution. You first have to go, okay, the federal government is
one of enumerated powers. Ah, that means anyone asserting a federal power
must be asserting. Ah, but once they've asserted, someone who then asserts
the First Amendment in response to them, they're now asserting, so the burden
shifts to the last asserter There's a series of inferential steps necessary to
construct a full-blown adjudicatory theory. That's not logically necessary, or
even necessarily obvious. But the things on which that is built, I think, are
logically necessary.
JACK BALKIN: Thank you.
UNIDENTIFIED: You talk about commands and resources. My question is
how foreign law would be able to be a resource in interpreting the
Constitution.
JACK BALKIN: I don't see why foreign law couldn't be a resource in
interpreting the Constitution. The Constitution itself speaks of the law of
nations. The early debates about interpretation asked what was the best
analogy to a federal constitution. Is the best analogy a treaty? If so, state
powers should be interpreted broadly and federal power narrowly. Or should it
be understood as analogous to a statute, in which case it should be interpreted
remedially to benefit its purposes.
Many features of international law and the law of nations could be relevant
to constitutional construction. The only problem I see - and it's in the nature
of the debate that people are now having - is whether you can get a significant
number of people in the public sphere to treat these resources as ones that they
19 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
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take seriously and care about.
This goes back to the discussion that David and I were having: What are the
rhetorical tools available in the public sphere at a particular time? Ironically,
the United States was involved in the creation of many of these international
human rights obligations. And then, as a result of domestic politics in the '40s
and '50s, the use of these kinds of claims was basically banished, because of
politics. It was tied to anti-communism and, I should also say, race relations.
These ideas were banished from American constitutional discourse.
But there's no particular reason why they couldn't become a part of
American constitutional discourse again. It's unlikely that courts will be the
leading actors in getting people to take seriously arguments from foreign law
and international human rights law. It's likely, rather, that people in public
life, in the public sphere, will insist that this is an appropriate kind of argument
to make, and that their opponents have to meet it. And at that point, courts
would be only too happy to follow along.
GARY LAWSON: From the standpoint of ascertaining meaning, it's
essentially impossible to come up with a plausible theory of ascertainment that
doesn't involve some reference to foreign law, if only the law of England as of
1788, because there are provisions of the Constitution that make no sense
without reference to the grounding in English law. In addition to the Law of
Nations Clause, the Piracy Clause, there are various other provisions that draw
their grounding from foreign law.
So if you're ascertaining meaning by asking what a reasonable hypothetical
observer in 1788 would have thought, well, yes, foreign law is going to play a
large role, at least with respect to some provisions. Where you're getting the
controversy today doesn't come from those provisions, it comes from the
construction, if you will, that has a lot of provisions drawing their application
meaning from evolving social values. And the reaction is, "Well, heck, if
we're going to do that, might as well be my social values and not those of
Portugal."
But that goes to the particular construction in which those arise. If you're
thinking about ascertainment of meaning, it's a clause-by-clause, provision-by-
provision assessment, and there are going to be lots of them for which foreign
law of various sorts, or international law broadly understood, are absolutely
indispensable.
And the only other thing I'll say is, Jack, the Constitution is neither a treaty
nor a statute. It's an agency instrument, an agency document. That's for
another time.
JAMES FLEMING: David, do you have a view on this question? Common-
law interpretation often is comparative. And, if I recall, Winterbottom,20 an
20 Winterbottom v. Wright (1842) 10 M&W 109.
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English case, was the precedent in your discussion of MacPherson21 in your
book.
DAVID STRAUSS: In principle, there's no reason not to draw on foreign law.
It's a source of other people's views. It's a source of latent wisdom. All the
things you'd say about American precedent, you could say about foreign
precedent, in principle.
The difficulty is really understanding it. And I think there are prudential
reasons to be careful about drawing on foreign law. It's embedded in a
different system, and I think it's very difficult for anyone to have good
intuitions about a foreign system and really understand how it works - this
principle makes sense only because there's another principle over here, and it's
the interaction of the two that makes sense out of it. It's very hard to know
that unless you're really immersed in that system. And to pluck one thing out
is dangerous. But that's really a matter of prudence, rather than a matter of
principle.
When you see a consensus on certain matters among foreign countries, it's
kind of remarkable that some Justices think that shouldn't matter at all. I
mean, if they want to explain it away, that's fine, but there are lots of things
that other countries do that we don't do, and there's some of them liberal, some
of them conservative, and we should pay attention to that.
And maybe the explanation's going to be, "Yes, but there are many, many
conditions there that make those sensible things to do that don't operate here,"
and then that would be an answer.
But I would say those two things. In principle, it seems fine. In practice,
you have to be wary. But there are occasions on which I think we should at
least think about it.
NAMRATA KOTWANI: This is a clarificatory question for Professor
Lawson. So if you're an originalist, it seems like what you're saying is, there
is this anti-construction presumption. You try to ascertain meaning, and it's
like constitutional avoidance in some sense; you avoid that question because
you can adjudicate it without having to go into constructing anything. But at
some point, construction must be inevitable, right? And what would an
originalist do then? Do you have a view on that?
GARY LAWSON: Well, no, I don't think it's inevitable at all. And when I
say I'm an originalist, I'm an originalist with respect to the ascertainment of
meaning. I think that's the way you figure out what this particular document
means, exactly the same way that you would figure out what the Rhode Island
charter of 1620 means, or whenever the Rhode Island charter was. You'd use
exactly the same interpretative tools to figure out what that means. What you
do with that meaning once you have it is a totally different question.
21 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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Construction gets into the realm of adjudication. And to have a theory of
adjudication - a theory about what people ought to do when presented with a
choice about, are you going to tell the federal marshals to shoot this person or
not - at that point ascertainment of meaning by itself can't tell you what to do.
You have to make a normative decision to take that ascertainment of meaning
and make it the foundation of your judgment. At that point, you're in the
realm of moral and political theory, and the humble lawyer here - and I'm
barely a lawyer - stops talking.
My only point is that it is possible to have a theory of adjudication that
doesn't rely at all on construction. Whether you would choose that particular
theory of adjudication, rather than one that is based on any particular
construction, is - like any choice about when to tell federal marshals to shoot
at people - ultimately a normative one.
So I'm not saying that's what I would do. I'm saying only that it's not
inevitable that that's what you have to do. There is an ascertainment - in fact,
if what you are doing is basing as much as you can on the ascertainment of
meaning, you wouldn't construct. That's all.
RESPONSE AND COLLOQUY CONCERNING THE PAPERS BY ABIGAIL MONCRIEFF
AND LARRY YACKLE
DAVID STRAUSS: My warm thanks to both Abby and Larry for these
comments, which are tremendously helpful and very kind. Having taught
Abby constitutional law, I'm going to take full credit for her success and her
excellence. I just want to get that on the videotape in case there are any issues
about that.
Let me first address Abby's thoughts, which I think are very important,
about how very often constitutional law gets made by deflecting things to the
political branches. This is a role courts play. She says this is inherently
political, and that the theory of constitutional law that I put forward doesn't
really have room for this, doesn't really account for this.
Abby's clearly right, that there are instances in which the courts effectively
allow law to be made by the other branches. But this is done in different ways,
and I want to separate them out in a slightly different way from the way Abby
separated them out, although I think in a way that's consistent with her
typology.
There are some doctrines in constitutional law that simply mandate
deference to the other branches of government. Those are very familiar ideas.
That in "economic and social legislation," the Supreme Court applies a very
lenient standard of review, and that's routinely upheld. And that is a way of
deferring important decisions to Congress.
A second category of doctrines - and Abby was right to focus on these -
don't quite work like that. The courts will decide an issue, but they'll do it in a
way that allows for pushback from the other branches, so that if the other
branches are very dissatisfied, or the states perhaps are very dissatisfied, with




The decisions on capital punishment in the mid-1970s were actually an
example of this. It's not clear the court understood what it was getting itself
into, but this is what it got itself into. It said capital punishment, as then
practiced in the United States, was unconstitutional - this was the common
denominator majority view - because it allowed too much discretion.
Whereupon, a large number of states enacted laws providing for the death
penalty that eliminated a lot of discretion, and the court upheld them. The
court, by saying, "The problem is you're allowing too much discretion,"
opened the door for this kind of pushback.
I think there are a number of doctrines that actually work that way, either
obviously or subtly, essentially saying, "We're going to strike down what
you've done, but if you come back and rethink, and come back with it maybe
in a different form, we will uphold it." I actually think a lot of that's going on
in the area of sex discrimination, for example. I think what the court wants to
see in that area is laws that reflect current views about the role of women. And
if it thinks the law reflects an overbroad and archaic generalization, as they
say, it will strike it down. But if the law reflects something rethought, I think
they're inclined to uphold it. That's not obvious, but I think that kind of thing
goes on. I think it's important. I think Abby's right to flag it.
Those two things, I wanted to say, are not particularly problematic for my
view, because the question whether doctrines like that should be adopted, I
would just fold into the common-law inquiry. I'd say it's a combination of
what do the precedents say and what makes sense. To the extent you're
concerned, either for reasons of precedent or for reasons of political morality,
that the court shouldn't be doing too much because it's undemocratic, these
kinds of doctrines will be congenial to you. To the extent you don't have those
concerns, you'll be less inclined to adopt these sorts of doctrines. But I think
these are straightforward constitutional doctrines, and you should think about
them the way you think about any others. So that's the way I would
incorporate those into the view.
Now, there are other things going on, too. This is where Abby began, really,
in her account. I think Henry Monahan is more like my second category. The
person I associate with this third category is Alexander Bickel and the so-
called passive virtues. And here, the idea is not an official doctrine that leaves
the door open for legislative pushback, but some device of avoidance that is in
some ways lawless. Denying certiorari in a case where otherwise certiorari
would be granted might be such a thing. Or manipulating doctrines of
mootness or standing, or other doctrines of justiciability, in order to avoid
deciding an issue, as the Court notoriously did with the issue of laws
forbidding interracial marriage in the immediate wake of Brown against the
Board. It refused to decide the issue, really lawlessly at that time, because the
case was in a category of cases the court was legally required to decide. The
court ducked it, thinking it would be too inflammatory to strike the law down.
Totally unprincipled to uphold the law forbidding interracial marriage in the
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wake of Brown, so it just avoided the issue for a decade.
Those devices, I think, are problematic, hard to square with a view like the
common-law understanding of the Constitution. I think, as I said, they are in
some ways lawless. Maybe not pejoratively so, but it is a political function,
not a legal function, to say of gay marriage today, as the court might say, "It's
just too inflammatory, we're going to figure out a way to duck it."
And then the fourth way the court engages in the political process, in
Abby's terms, you might think of as just sheer political maneuvering. "Okay,
we've gotten into a lot of trouble with the left lately on our rulings on
campaign finance, affirmative action, and gun rights, so let's beef up the
restrictions on abortion and that'll make sure nobody really gets too angry at
us." I don't know if they do that; I doubt they do it consciously. It could very
well be some of them at least do it unconsciously. That's also a kind of
political maneuvering. I also see that as something that a common-law
approach to the Constitution does not justify. That's not the exercise of
common-law power.
What I would say, though, is those last two things, the avoidance and the
maneuvering, are more or less inevitable. This is something a court's going to
do. You're going to have people on the court who are politically astute; that's
how they got there. They didn't get there by writing books like Jack's. Not
that he won't get there, but the book probably won't help him. Or mine.
These are people who got where they got by having a degree of political
astuteness. They've been through the political process. They're to some
degree political animals. They're working in a charged political environment.
They know what's going on. And it is really too much to expect them not to
do things like this, I think. However much we might lament them. Or maybe
we don't lament them. But in any event, I think as a practical matter, they're
going to do it.
And it's possible, I suppose - Abby wasn't quite going in this direction, I
don't think, although I think it's maybe one reading of her remarks - that some
sort of originalism would put more of a limit on that, that there's more
flexibility in the common-law view, and that would allow for more of this
maneuvering. I think that is possible, and I think that's a potential criticism of
the view. I actually think originalism, as it's practiced at least, is very, very
flexible, and I'm not sure at all that it would put up more of a barrier to this
kind of maneuvering. But maybe it would. Maybe the common-law view
gives more cover to that kind of maneuvering.
But my basic answer to Abby is, yes, it goes on. Yes, it's inconsistent with
the common-law view. It's going to go on under any view more or less to the
same extent. It's in the nature of the role that the court plays in our society.
So that degree of confession and avoidance to her arguments.
As for Larry's remarks, I'll begin at the end, with the flag. I think the
monarch actually plays that role in a lot of countries. There's your symbol of
unity, you have the queen, and that's what holds you together. You don't need




Two thoughts. One of this question of the Constitution playing a
coordinating role in laying out points of agreement. I think I heard Larry say,
look, there are lots of documents, like the Massachusetts Vehicular Code, that
have this function of giving us these focal points that people can coordinate
around, because they need to coordinate. Why do we treat the Constitution as
the Constitution when there are lots of documents that serve this function?
I think what I want to say is that the causation runs the other way. Here is
the way I would think about this. Supposing you were addressing a skeptic
who said to someone who is not an originalist, like me, "Listen, you have
already discarded the specific judgments that the Framers made when those
were not encoded in clear text. You don't care about those, or at least you're
willing to override them. Why do you care about them when they're encoded
in text? It's just arbitrary that some stuff they happened to write down, and
some stuff they meant but didn't write it down, maybe because they thought no
one could mistake what they were trying to accomplish.
"When they don't write it down, you're willing to interpret your way around
it, or common law your way around it. So what's so sacred about the stuff
they wrote down? Why don't you treat that the same way? It could be the
present-day Constitution in New Zealand, et cetera. So what's so great about
the text?"
That's the skeptic's challenge to non-originalists. It's not that easy to meet,
I think. The way I would meet it is to say, well, it happens to be the case that
people accept the Constitution. That's a sociological fact. It doesn't have to
be that way. They could accept some other document, or no document. It
happens to be the case they accept this. It's very, very useful that they accept
it, because there are provisions in there that settle things that need to be settled.
So we might as well take advantage of that happy sociological fact.
So the causation runs from the acceptance to its usefulness in resolving
these issues, rather than the other way around, which is what I think Larry was
saying about the Massachusetts Code. And I think that is basically the whole
story. My answer to the skeptic would be that story, and it is a way of
preserving the point Larry began with, which is you just don't have a plausible
theory if you discard the text of the Constitution. That's just not acceptable to
do. That's not part of our culture.
The second question, about how should a constitution be drafted, or should
it be drafted at all, given the way ours has evolved away from the text, is a
great question. I've been thinking about it since I read Larry's draft. I don't
have a very good answer. Let me give you the first cut - which I now think is
not quite right, but may be illuminatingly wrong - and then say something
weaker that I think might be right.
The first cut would be to say, well, here's what you want to do in the written
constitution. You want to pin down as many things as you can pin down that
are relatively uncontroversial. You definitely want to get some rules of the
road down, some procedures down so that the government can get going and
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people won't be fighting over basics. You want to empower a legislature and
say how it's going to be constituted, and you want to set up some version of an
executive branch, and you want to set up courts and whatever other institutions
you need. Try to get that stuff down to the extent that it's something that
people say, "Oh, it's not my optimal solution, but it's good enough," so that
some things are settled, and particularly the institutional machinery is settled
and it can get going.
And as to other things - this was my first take on this, based on our
experience - what you really want to do is make sure you don't hem in your
successors with language that is going to be a real problem for them.
So if, for example, the drafters the Fourteenth Amendment, in drafting
Section One with the Privileges or Immunities and Equal Protection Clauses
had said what they thought - "Nothing in this provision, however, shall impair
the right of the states to establish racially segregated schools" - had they
written that in there, it would have been a terrible problem for us. Or,
"Nothing in this provision shall require the elimination of disabilities of
married women." They didn't think they were eliminating the disabilities of
married women, but they didn't write it down. Had they written it down, it
would have been a big problem for us.
So for the first cut, I'd say, leave as much open as you can, because later
generations might disagree with you, and you don't want to create a real
problem by boxing them in. So only pin down the stuff that's relatively
uncontroversial.
The reason I think that in the end that's not right is, I think constitutions can
sometimes resolve things. And if you think about the experience of slavery,
that is what they did with slavery. They kind of kept it out of the picture. The
slave trade they entrenched until 1808. Otherwise, they facilitated it in some
ways with the Fugitive Slave Clause. But they kicked the can down the road,
and that turned out to be disastrous. It's hard to see how things could have
been worse than the resolution they worked with slavery, the way things turned
out.
So that's why I hesitate with the prescription that seems to follow from the
common-law view. What I would say, though, is what Framers of a written
constitution have to be very attentive to is what means of change are available
in your society? How does your society go about changing things? We
happened to inherit this common-law tradition from England, and we knew
how to work it. And it was built into our legal, political, and even popular
culture, that the judges would do this, and there was an element of maintaining
continuity with the past. And even the American Revolution itself purported to
maintain continuity with the ancient liberties of Englishmen. So we are pretty
good at changing things in this way. And you should be attuned to that,
because the way you prescribe changes in your document is not going to be the
only way the society will change.
Now, if you have a society that doesn't have those traditions - let's say it
has a very robust tradition of markets, and the markets are vibrant and means
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of change and changing social relations - and that's the way your society often
changes things, you should be aware of that, take advantage of that, and
structure the constitution in a way that allows for that means of change.
Or, if your society is relatively small, and there are cohesive social
networks, and they provide a means of change, leave that door open. But,
drafters of the Constitution, don't think that you're able to monopolize the
means of change in your equivalent of Article V. Because that, I think, is a
lesson from our experience.
It's a great question. That's inadequate, but the best I can do. And again, I
thank both of you for being very kind and very instructive.
HUGH BAXTER: I wonder if you could say a few words about Griswold,
22
whether it's in your view any kind of an exemplary decision. It's an odd one
to pick for the point of view of common-law theory. It has the penumbras and
emanations - not emanating from case law, but emanating from textual
provisions. I don't remember reading anything about Griswold in your book,
and I was curious if you would have a comment on it.
DAVID STRAUSS: It's a case purporting to be based on text. That's a hard
case to make. I think there was a set of cases in the late '60s and early '70s
that were, at first glance, hard to fit together, but in retrospect seem to be
explicable. They were about "privacy and about sex discrimination." And I
think they went together. I think one way to understand Griswold is it's part of
the same package as the revolution in women's roles that was going on at the
time.
If you look at women's workforce participation, starting in the early 1960s it
shoots up. And various other things were changing in the status of women.
You were getting some employment discrimination laws. You're getting
changes in the patterns in the workplace. And I think you can see Griswold
and, to some extent, Roe23 - although Roe is complicated by the state interest
on the other side - as related to this. As well as the sex discrimination cases
that begin coming out of the Supreme Court in the early 1970s.
You can see the Court picking up on this development, a little bit in the
cases, but more in other forces in society. And picking up on that and
gradually working its way toward developing a doctrine.
The reason Griswold was a logical place to begin ties into something Jack
said before: the statute in Griswold was a complete outlier and barely enforced.
It was in fact enforced against clinics, but otherwise not enforced. The statute
in Griswold forbade anyone, including married couples, from using
contraceptives. So a really wild statute, or the opposite of wild.
So think of a court thinking, okay, here is something that's breaking through
in society, society's moving in this direction, here is a real outlier; this is a
22 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
23 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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good place for us to start. We'll put our toe in the water - I'm mixing
metaphors - we'll begin here and see how far we can go. Abby talks about
pushback, I think they left the door open for pushback.
If you talk to clerks who clerked in the term that Roe was decided, or read
the papers, you see that they underestimated how big a deal Roe was. They
thought that was the next incremental step. They just didn't understand the
issue. They didn't understand how difficult a moral issue this is, period, and
certainly for a lot of people.
But I think that's what you see them doing, picking up on currents expressed
through legal and non-legal means, and moving the doctrine in that direction.
HUGH BAXTER: You sound a lot like Jack.
DAVID STRAUSS: Well, I don't think this has anything to do with the
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. Zero.
HUGH BAXTER: The social movements point.
DAVID STRAUSS: Well, there are social movements, and there are social
movements. The fact that some people in society are agitating for something,
that's a very small piece of evidence. When you start to see legal changes and
changes in other relationships in society, that counts for something. But in a
society like ours, there are always going to be some people out there agitating,
and the number of times the courts should take that on, as opposed to letting
legislatures deal with it, or letting economic forces deal with it, or just letting it
die out, that's the difficult question.
UNIDENTIFIED: In retrospect, should a constitution include a provision for
a rule for its interpretation?
DAVID STRAUSS: The economists ask you this question whenever you have
a paper on interpretation. They say, "Why doesn't the legislature just enact a
code to govern statutory interpretation and save us all this anguish?" And I'm
not sure I know the answer, except it doesn't happen, and it doesn't seem like
it would work.
You could say you just get a regress. You enact this provision governing
interpretation. Then you've got to interpret that. That, I think, is a piece of the
problem.
I think another part of it might just be that these interpretative approaches
just don't lend themselves to codification. And if you tried to codify them, you
would either accomplish nothing, or you'd screw things up, because you'd get
it wrong enough so now you had another hurdle to overcome.
But other than that, I don't know the answer. We do know that there are a
couple of instances of it, but by and large, you don't see these things. You
don't see useful canons of interpretation enacted into law.
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UNIDENTIFIED: Well, we see the problem, that if originalism were to be the
rule in the Constitution, we've seen what's happened to what is originalism,
how it started and how it's gone on and may continue to go on. So even if
there were a rule of interpretation, perhaps over time there would be the
common-law approach to be taken because of changed circumstances.
DAVID STRAUSS: Yes, that's a version of the regress problem. Suppose
they enacted a provision that said, "This Constitution shall be interpreted
according to the original public meaning of the document." Well, then you
have a body of law on what constitutes the original public meaning, and that
could easily take on a common law-ish turn.
GARY LAWSON: There are academics who would suggest both
constitutional rules for constitutional interpretation and codes of statutory
interpretation; it's not unknown.
UNIDENTIFIED: You talked a little bit about places in the Constitution
where originalism has been defeated, i.e., the Equal Protection Clause. It
didn't contemplate women being beneficiaries of the Clause. How would you
give advice to someone trying to resurrect a provision of the Constitution that
has been deemed, I guess, dead, or without doctrine, i.e., the Thirteenth
Amendment?
DAVID STRAUSS: Let me do one small clarification at the risk of being
pedantic, because this actually came up in another conference. What the
Framers of the Equal Protection Clause did not specifically envision was that
women would be free of discrimination, which is different from their not being
beneficiaries. They would be beneficiaries, they could make a claim under the
Equal Protection Clause, they just couldn't claim to be free of discrimination.
If it were a purely common-law system, the fact that there is a Thirteenth
Amendment there, and it hasn't been used much, it wouldn't matter. You
would revive it by generating a new body of doctrine, which would respond to
various needs, and you would assemble a precedential basis for doing it.
In our actual system, you do get a boost out of the text, but I think that's
because some people in our system, either out of confusion or out of their own
commitment or out of opportunism, are textualists and originalists. The recent
example of that is the Second Amendment. The Second Amendment seemed
to be dead, as far as imposing judiciable rights, until 20 years ago. Then this
movement arose, let's mobilize around the Second Amendment, and the
opinion in Heller24 at least is written strictly in the terms that your question
envisions - Here's this amendment. Here's what it said. Let's enforce it. End
of story.
24 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.570 (2008).
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That way of doing constitutional law makes no sense to me. I don't
understand why we should resolve an issue about gun control laws that way.
They might be good, they might be bad, but the idea that we're going to
resolve it by trying to figure out what they were up to in the late eighteenth
century, I don't understand why a society would do that.
I also don't think that was in fact what was going on. I think it's a
combination of political commitments and some culture war stuff - which
really shouldn't have been in the picture - maybe combined with a sense of,
"There really is a societal consensus about this." I don't believe there was, but
that would be the legitimate piece of it on a common-law view.
The view I would have taken of that case is, since the Industrial Revolution
hit America, you don't see any evidence in the cases of anyone suggesting that
the Constitution posed a barrier to gun control laws until quite recently. As
recently as 1990, Chief Justice Burger said it's a fraud to read the Second
Amendment that way. Elite opinion was united against it. There was massive
lot of gun control legislation. No litigation. That's a pretty strong common-
law story, and if you want to chip away it, okay. But then you've got to tell the
story in those terms and not simply say, "Yeah, what do you know? We have
this constitutional provision." That's the heart of the common-law view.
JACK BALKIN: Can I say something about these matters? I have some
advice and a little counterhistory. The counterhistory is that women actually
were considered to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause. The problem was that married women weren't. So afemme
sole, as unmarried women were then called, had civil equality with men. The
problem was, everybody assumed that this was a very small class of people -
women were either living in their father's house or they got married and lived
in their husband's house. The common-law rules of coverture meant that a
woman surrendered all of her common-law rights upon marriage because the
wife's legal identity was merged into that of her husband's. The doctrine of
marital unity is a fiction. This was the source of the problem. It wasn't that
women weren't entitled to civil equality. It's just that the Framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment didn't believe that the new amendment would change
the common-law coverture rules.
The story of the Second Amendment is actually a little more complicated.
There's some, but not much, evidence of an individual right to bear arms in
self-defense around 1791 - as opposed to a republican duty to bear arms to
defend the country from tyranny. The evidence for such a right grows
increasingly strong through Reconstruction. And by the time of
Reconstruction, lots of people think that the right to bear arms is an individual
right of self-defense. But this would have been a civil right, not a political
right. The right to serve in the militia to defend the republic and overthrow a
tyrannical government is a political right. But a right of individual self-defense




The Labor movement, and then later, Prohibition - which led to the rise of
bootleggers and gangsters - changed people's minds about the role of the
Second Amendment. The key case, the Miller25 case, arises out of the
problems created by Prohibition. Basically gangsters and bootleggers are
running around with guns, and people think "we can't have this, we have to
clamp down."
So it's during the 20th century that gun control is increasingly widely
accepted, and that's largely because people are afraid of labor activists and
they're afraid of gangsters.
The modem movement for gun rights occurs in the wake of the
assassinations of Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy, which led to new
federal gun control laws. Those laws stoke a political reaction, which
eventually leads to the modem movement for gun rights, which eventually - in
common-law fashion, you might even say - leads to the recognition by the
Supreme Court in Heller.
So belief in an individual right to bear arms in self-defense has waxed and
waned throughout American history.
A note on the Thirteenth Amendment. It could have been a far more
powerful source of rights. Certainly the people who framed it thought it would
have this effect. But the Fourteenth Amendment kicks it to the curb, so to
speak. Once you have the Fourteenth Amendment, the Thirteenth becomes
less important, for a number of overlapping reasons.
There's an attempt to revive it, especially around the turn of the twentieth
century. There are a few cases decided by the Supreme Court. And then
there's a further attempt to revive it in the '30s and '40s in order to protect
migrant workers and blacks in low-skilled occupations. But the NAACP's
litigation strategy is focused on schools, and especially professional schools,
and they believe that the Fourteenth Amendment is a better vehicle. As a
result, the Thirteenth Amendment strategy for black equality is de-emphasized.
But of course, why this happens is a question of what were people trying to
do, how they tried to use the resources that were available to them. If you
wanted to revive the Thirteenth Amendment today - especially if you were
thinking of the Thirteenth Amendment as a means of attacking political
powerlessness, domination, and economic inequality - you would have to start
again, and get a lot of people to talk in terms of the Thirteenth Amendment and
to take seriously Thirteenth Amendment-style claims.
I just want to point out that it can be done. Before December of 2000,
nobody took seriously the kinds of arguments that George W. Bush's lawyers
made in Bush v. Gore.26 Then, suddenly, because a lot of influential people
got behind them and started pushing them, these arguments became serious
constitutional arguments. They moved from off the wall to on the wall.
So if you want the Thirteenth Amendment to rise again, I would advise that
25 United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
26 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
2012] 1305
1306 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW [Vol. 92:1271
you follow the example of the NRA and make a big deal about it, start putting
bumper stickers on your car, and start talking about how important your
Thirteenth Amendment rights are. You should form social mobilizations and
get a political party to agree that what you think about the Constitution is very
important. And then eventually get the Attorney General of the United States
to assert your views in a brief - that's what Attorney General Ashcroft did
when he asserted that the individual right to bear arms is a right recognized by
the U.S. government. Then you should work to appoint a bunch of Justices
who agree with you. And then, poof, you have a case like Heller. The same
thing might happen someday with the Thirteenth Amendment.
